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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Noel C. Gardner, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
Mary E. Gardner, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appeal No. 20100520-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(h). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2009) (stating that the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over "appeals from district court involving domestic relations 
cases"). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Noel's Petition to Modify 
Amended Decree of Divorce when it refused to take any evidence relevant to the material 
factual dispute, made inadequate and erroneous factual findings in support, and 
determined that no substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred? 
l 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's determination that there has not been a 
substantial and material change in the parties' circumstances sufficient to justify 
modification of a divorce decree is reviewed for an abuse of the court's discretion. See 
Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3,14, 201 P.3d 301. An appellate court "will not disturb 
a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . [However, a] 
challenge to the legal adequacy of factual findings in a divorce modification proceeding 
presents a question of law and is reviewed for correctness." Id. 11 5 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Issue II: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Noel's request to 
hold Mary in contempt of court and, consequently, in foreclosing Noel from presenting 
evidence of and recovering for damages he suffered as a result of Mary's actions? 
Standard of Review: "The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
the trial court's action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or 
a clear abuse of discretion." Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, | 8, 973 P.2d 988 
(internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court's subsidiary factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error, see Young, 2009 UT App 3,^5, while its legal interpretations 
are reviewed for correctness, see Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, f^ 6, 221 P.3d 888, 
cert, granted 2010 Utah LEXIS 19 (Utah, Jan. 20, 2010). 
Preserved: R. 1117-1205; 1262-1310. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
* The following rules, statutes, and cases are determinative to this appeal and are 
reproduced in their entirety in the Addenda to this brief: 
• Addendum A - Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2010) 
• Addendum B - Amended Decree of Divorce, dated June 28, 1994 
• Addendum C - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated June 3, 2010 
• Addendum D - Order Defining Hold Harmless Clause, Denying Petitioner's 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, Receipt of Exhibits, Denial of Attorney 
I Fees, and Other Related Matters, dated June 3, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
) This is a contempt and divorce modification case. A trial was scheduled in this 
matter for February 10, 2010, to resolve Dr. Noel C. Gardner's Petition to Modify 
Amended Decree of Divorce and his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as well as Ms. 
Mary H. Gardner's Counter Motion. Immediately after welcoming the parties on the 
morning of trial, the court determined that no evidence from either party would be 
considered and that it would instead dispose of the case as a matter of law. Pertinent to 
this appeal, the court then denied Dr. Gardner's petition to modify on the basis that, 
although no evidence was taken or considered, Dr. Gardner had failed to make a showing 
of a substantial and material change in the parties' circumstances. In addition, the court 
denied Dr. Gardner's request for damages pursuant to his motion for order to show cause 
because it concluded that Mary had not failed to hold him harmless and his asserted 
damages were "extraordinarily speculative" as that term is used in Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 
UT 7, 227 P.3d 246. Finally, Ms. Gardner formally withdrew her Counter Motion on the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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morning of trial and, without entertaining argument, the court denied Dr. Gardner's 
request for attorney fees for defending against this bad faith Counter Motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The petitioner, Dr. Noel C. Gardner, and the respondent, Ms. Mary H. Gardner, 
were married in June 1984. Two children were born during the parties' relatively short 
and tumultuous marriage: Loren, born September 6, 1985 (now age 25); and Jeffrey, 
born July 21, 1988 (now age 22). As with many couples, the parties' differing 
approaches to financial matters was a primary reason for the deterioration of their 
marriage. Specifically, Mary had difficulty managing the marital finances and 
consistently "liv[ed] beyond the couple's resources, often neglecting to pay existing debts 
before incurring further debt," whereas Noel held a firm commitment to budgeting and 
frugality. R. 36. Following more than three years of negotiation, the parties were 
divorced by entry of an Amended Decree of Divorce on or about June 28, 1994, which 
was based on the parties' stipulated property settlement agreement and reflected their 
respective financial positions at the time: Noel had just begun his career as a physician 
and earned approximately $12,000 per month; Mary was an experienced registered nurse 
who had historically earned approximately $3,000 per month but, due to a then recent 
back surgery, was unemployed and earning no income. See R. 18, 61. At the time of this 
stipulation and entry of the parties' divorce decree, Loren was 8 years old and Jeffrey was 
just shy of 6 years old. 
4 
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Pertinent to the present appeal, the parties', stipulated divorce decree awarded 
> Mary sole custody of the parties' minor children with Noel to receive liberal parent time. 
See R. 236-37. The parties' decree also awarded Mary alimony and child support 
totaling $4,000 per month. See R. 243-44. Despite her experience as a registered nurse, 
no income was imputed to Mary because she was "attending graduate school on a part-
time basis in an attempt to secure a Master's Degree in Public Health." R. 230, f Y. The 
decree expressly contemplated that Mary would work only part-time after completing her 
education. See id. Mary was also awarded the marital residence free and clear of any 
claim by Noel so that she could raise Jeffrey and Loren in the home. See R. 238. 
Although Mary received a sizable and equitable distribution of the parties' marital estate 
she was, at the time of the divorce, financially unable to refinance the mortgage on the 
marital home into her name alone. In order to protect Noel from this obligation, the 
parties agreed and the trial court ordered that Mary would "assume and pay and hold 
[Noel] harmless from ... the first mortgage on the [marital] home to Washington 
Federal." R. 246. At the time of the parties' divorce the marital home was valued at 
approximately $200,000 with a mortgage balance owing to Washington Federal of 
approximately $140,000. See R. 415. 
Post-Divorce 
Almost immediately after entry of the parties' divorce decree, Noel became 
concerned that Mary would not timely make the monthly payments toward the 
Washington Federal mortgage. In an attempt to protect the home from foreclosure and 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
avoid damage to either his or Mary's credit ratings, Noel began making the monthly 
mortgage payment directly to Washington Federal and deducting that amount from his 
monthly alimony obligation paid to Mary. See R. 332. Mary resisted this approach and, 
in June 1996, the court granted Mary's request and ordered Noel to stop paying toward 
the first mortgage to Washington Federal; specifically, he was ordered to pay to Mary the 
full monthly alimony amount as outlined in the Amended Decree of Divorce and Mary 
was ordered to resume making the monthly mortgage payment. See R. 353. Noel 
faithfully paid his alimony and child support as ordered and did not again make a 
payment toward the Washington Federal mortgage. 
Fast forward more than a dozen years to late 2008. The parties have been 
divorced for more than sixteen (16) years. The parties' children, Loren and Jeffrey, are 
no longer minors. Mary now has a Master's Degree in public health and is employed as 
the Director of Business Development at Community Nursing Services, earning 
approximately $100,000 annually. See R. 1070. Mary has remarried and subsequently 
divorced. See R. 1069. The parties' marital home is now worth approximately $400,000 
and the mortgage owed to Washington Federal is approximately $100,000. See R. 425. 
The monthly mortgage payment to Washington Federal is approximately $1300. Noel 
has been remarried for more than fifteen (15) years to his current wife, Connie. Noel and 
Connie have two minor children together including a pre-teen daughter who is 
developmentally disabled and may never be able to live independently. See R. 1066. 
6 
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Mary's Failure to Pay the Mortgage 
> Throughout his adult life, Noel has carefully managed his credit as part of his 
overall plan for personal and professional financial stability. With this cautious financial 
approach Noel had, prior to summer 2008, earned an excellent credit score comfortably 
l 
in the high 700s and ready access to approximately $440,000 in credit, including a 
$400,000 home equity line of credit on his home and nearly $35,000 in personal and 
business credit. In mid-October 2008, Noel received a completely unexpected letter 
informing him that, after a review of his credit report, American Express had reduced his 
personal credit card limit from $22,600 to $4,700. See R. 1358-64, fflf 8-9. A thorough 
review of his credit report at that time revealed that Mary had missed payments on the 
Washington Federal mortgage in July, August, September, and October 2008, which 
payments had been negatively reported on Noel's credit because he is still listed as a joint 
obligor on the mortgage. See id. f 9. 
Over the next few weeks, Noel left several telephone messages for Mary to call 
him about the mortgage issues. When Mary finally returned Noel's call, she informed 
him that she had only been late on one mortgage payment "due to a one-time emergency, 
but that there was no danger that the home would go into foreclosure, and that the matter 
would shortly be resolved."1 Id. % 10. Despite Mary's assurances, the damage to Noel's 
' The extent of Mary's failure to pay the mortgage was one of the most hotly contested 
factual disputes in this case. Although the Washington Federal Mortgage was 
consistently delinquent to some degree for more than two years, it was fortuitously 
7 
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finances was far from over. On November 5, 2008, Noel received another notice 
informing him that American Express was reducing his business credit card limit from 
approximately $10,000 to $1,100. See id. f 11. And on November 21, 2008, Noel 
received notice that Chase Bank had suspended his $400,000 home equity line of credit 
because of his recently reported credit activity. See id. f 16. Specifically, Chase stated 
that this suspension was the result of "Delinquent Past or Present Credit Obligations with 
Others." Respondent's Exhibit #8. By the time the dust had settled, Noel's ready 
access to credit had been reduced by more than 99%, from $449,400 to $3,700; this 
reduction occurred over a period of less than four (4) months from October 2008 through 
January 2009. 
This precipitous loss of credit was both personally and professionally damaging 
for Noel. See generally R. 1070-84. As stated above, Noel and his current wife have a 
developmentally disabled daughter who may never be capable of living independently. 
The $400,000 home equity line of credit had served as both a personal safety net for Noel 
and his family in the event he is unable to work for any period of time and as an 
investment nest egg so that Noel could capitalize on any professional opportunities that 
would allow him to spend more time with his family. See R. 1073,1079. In addition to 
suffering unnecessary stress, inconvenience, and embarrassment, Noel's drastically 
reduced credit score prevented him from refinancing his own mortgage to a favorable 
brought current on the day scheduled for trial in this matter. See Respondent's Exhibit 
#3; R. 835-36. 
8 
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interest rate that would have saved him tens of thousands of dollars over the life of the 
> loan. See R. 1077-78, 1082. 
Noel also suffered immensely from a professional standpoint. Noel (Dr. Noel 
Gardner) is a nationally-recognized psychiatrist who works at a mental health clinic in 
f 
Utah, regularly testifies as an expert witness, and lectures on behalf of Eli Lilly and other 
pharmaceutical companies. Most recently, he was the prosecution's expert witness in the 
highly-publicized criminal trial of Brian David Mitchell (the Elizabeth Smart case). 
Noel's profession requires him to travel extensively and he is often required to pay the 
travel costs upfront for which he is later reimbursed. See R. 1071-72. Necessarily, the 
proper functioning of Noel's business is very dependent on ready access to credit. After 
Noel's business limit was reduced to only $1,100, he was unable to pay for his necessary 
travel expenses upfront without paying off the expenses for his prior trip, whether or not 
he had yet been reimbursed. And the damage was cyclical; Noel's credit score continued 
to drop due to a high balance to credit ratio—a $1,000 charge for travel expenses is 90% 
of his new credit limit, whereas the same $1,000 charge would have been only 10% of his 
original credit limit. See R. 1358-64, f 11; R. 1072. Lastly, Noel was unable to seize a 
significant business opportunity to become a partner at a mental health clinic because he 
lacked the credit to do so. See R. 1078. 
Proceedings 
In an attempt to prevent further destruction of his finances, Noel filed a Petition to 
Modify Amended Decree of Divorce in December 2008 seeking to eliminate the joint 
9 
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obligation on Mary's mortgage either by forced refinancing or sale of the property, also 
praying for reimbursement of his out-of-pocket costs and attorney fees incurred as a 
result of Mary's failings. See R. 421-65. Noel supported this requested modification 
with allegations that Mary's failure to pay the mortgage timely had caused significant 
damage to both his credit score and his access to ready credit. See Rs 1358-1449. In 
response, Mary filed a countermotion against Noel claiming that he had failed to pay for 
the children's college education expenses and had also failed to meet his "moral 
obligation" to reimburse her for her voluntary expenditures toward the adult children's 
"room and board, school supplies, car insurance, gas, food, and clothing from ... 2005 
[through] ... 2009." R. 486; Petitioner's Exhibit #14, pgs. 95-101. Finally, Noel 
obtained an Order to Show Cause, seeking contempt and appropriate sanctions against 
Mary on the basis that she had failed to "assume and pay and hold [him] harmless from 
... the first mortgage on the home to Washington Federal." See R. 615-18; R. 246-47. 
In conducting discovery, Noel took Mary's deposition on April 29, 2009. See R. 
802-04; Petitioner's Exhibit #14. With regards to the Washington Federal mortgage, 
Mary acknowledged that the payment is due on the 1st of each month, that her payment is 
late if made on the 2nd of each month, and that she is charged a late fee if her payment is 
not made until the 16th of each month. See Petitioner's Exhibit #14, pgs. 39-41. Mary 
also conceded that, although she did not contemplate missing a mortgage payment at the 
time she and Noel were divorced, she had in fact missed a mortgage payment in June 
2008 and December 2008, further agreeing that she had to make three (3) months worth 
10 
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of payments in December 2008 and two (2) months worth of payments in January 2009 
> in order to bring her mortgage current. See id., pgs. 46, 72-74,110,112. Mary also 
explained that she was not aware of the missed payment in June because she "didn't open 
any mail from the bank that would have notified [her]." Id., pg. 49. 
With respect to her countermotion for recovery of the adult children's "education" 
expenses, Mary testified that at the time she filed her countermotion only one of the 
parties' adult children was actually in college and that she had no idea how much life 
insurance or college money Noel had established for the boys' benefit. Id., pgs. 82, 85, 
87. Nevertheless, Mary did acknowledge that Noel had spent approximately $20,000 for 
the boys' tuition expenses, had paid for their textbooks, and had bought a laptop and a 
computer for their studies. Id., pg. 99. She further acknowledged that she had spent 
"Zero" for the boys' college tuition or books. IcL Mary then asserted that she believed 
Noel had "a moral obligation"—because he makes more money than she does—to 
reimburse her for all voluntary expenses she has paid on behalf of the adult boys, 
specifically including their "living expenses, [] car insurance, out-of-pocket medical 
expenses, any nonprescription medications, food, travel money ..., clothing, vacations, 
birthdays, holidays," and even gifts she had purchased for the adult children to give to 
Noel for Christmas and his birthday. Id., pgs. 97-98. When asked to explain how these 
expenses constitute educational expenses, Mary explained her belief "that if they can't 
live and have a life, they probably can't be very successful in school." Id., pg. 98. 
n 
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Trial 
Trial in this matter was originally scheduled for December 17 and 18, 2009, before 
the Honorable Robert P. Faust. See R. 835-36. Just one week prior to trial, on or about 
December 9, 2009, Mary filed a motion to continue the trial date on the basis that her 
financial situation was so stressful and out of control that she was "both physically and 
emotionally unable to not only appear [sic] for the trial but to attend to and conduct trial 
preparation matters." R. 844-56. More specifically, Mary informed the court that she 
had suffered from significant financial, family, and work-related stressors over the three 
months prior to trial that had caused her to lose weight, lose her appetite, and become 
extremely anxious. See R. 850-55. The trial court granted Mary's request and 
rescheduled the trial for February 10, 2010, informing the parties that the Honorable Paul 
G. Maughan would be assigned to hear the matter: This assignment represented Judge 
Maughan's first involvement in this case. See R. 857. 
On the morning scheduled for trial, the court began by stating that it believed the 
central issue to be "what it means to hold harmless," which the court identified as a legal 
determination "that's not going to be influenced or impacted by any set of facts that 
either party has today." R. 1116, pgs. 1, 7. The parties agreed in part, clarifying that 
there were significant tangential issues and that the court had to make a separate 
determination as to whether there had been substantial and material changes in the 
parties' circumstances and whether Mary's countermotion had been brought or asserted 
in bad faith. See id. at 2-6. Mary's counsel then informed the court that Mary was 
12 
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withdrawing her countermotion. See id. at 2. Noel was therefore precluded from 
arguing for his attorney fees incurred in defending himself against Mary's baseless 
countermotion for a year. In fact, despite considering no evidence or argument on this 
issue, the court ruled on Noel's request for fees with one word: "Denied." Id. at 23. 
Although the court acknowledged that there were genuine factual disputes to be 
resolved it continued trying to shape the day, stating that the court had a duty to conserve 
judicial resources and avoid "tak[ing] more time or gofing] off astray when we don't 
need to." Id. at 9. Following a very brief discussion with the parties, the court refused to 
consider either party's evidence and made its ruling: 
I think probably the best way for everyone at this point is for 
the Court to just forge ahead and make a legal ruling on what it means 
in the Court's mind to hold harmless in a divorce proceeding and ... 
as it's been stated, there's no legal authority in Utah on this matter.[ 1 
... [And based on the court's interpretation of the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Ashbv v. Ashbv, 2010 UT 7, 227 P.3d 246, issued 
the day before trial, the court concludes that a]ny recovery to the 
extent that [Noel] is seeking would be extraordinarily speculative and 
the Court finds that what hold harmless means is that [Mary] has to 
hold [Noel] harmless to the mortgage. ... 
So I'm limiting hold harmless in this matter in this divorce in this 
type of equitable proceeding to damages suffered by [Noel] for late 
payments, for instance if there were foreclosure or if he had to pay 
money that he wasn't planning on paying and/or contempt for failure 
of [Mary] to pay. So that's what hold harmless means to the Court 
today in this proceeding. 
2
 The court also rejected Noel's offer to provide briefing as to how other jurisdictions 
define "hold harmless" because the court was "afraid to even go that way. I mean, I 
just—I'm afraid as to what might come in." R. 1116, pgs. 14-15. 
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Id. at 17-19. When pressed for clarification, the court affirmed that Noel could have 
recovered for any late payments he had made, but not for the damage caused by late 
payments Mary had made because that damage, as a matter of law, is "too speculative." 
See id. at 19-20. In other words, even if Noel could prove to a certainty that Mary's 
failure to pay the mortgage timely had caused him significant financial damage, he could 
not recover unless and until he had made payments to the mortgage company or 
Washington Federal had begun the foreclosure process. See id.; id. at 24. 
It should be noted that the court's decision was based, in large part, on its 
agreement with Mary's counsel that Noel could not show that Mary had failed to hold 
him harmless because, to do so, "he would have to show that the [Washington Federal] 
mortgage payment is suing him, was in default, was in foreclosure, they had asked him to 
make payments, that he had suffered some kind of damages and that's not the facts of this 
case." Id. at 5-6 (emphases added). However, these are the facts of this case as 
demonstrated by the evidence proffered by each party.3 Each party proffered as a trial 
exhibit a demand letter from Washington Federal dated November 3, 2008 that 
undisputedly evidenced not only that the mortgage had been in default, but also that 
Washington Federal had demanded that Noel make several immediate payments on the 
mortgage in order to avoid foreclosure. See Respondent's Exhibit #6; Petitioner's 
3
 Although the trial court refused to consider either party's evidence, the court received 
each party's proffered exhibits for the purpose of completing the record in the event an 
appeal was taken: specifically, the trial court received Noel's exliibits number 1-8 and 12-
60 as well as Mary's exhibits number 1-20. See R. 1330. 
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Exhibit #28. More specifically, this letter made clear that Mary's mortgage "[wa]s in 
> default for failure to remit the September and October payments/' that she was behind 
more than $4,000 (or more than 3 months) in mortgage payments, and that Washington 
Federal was considering "acceleration of the sums secured by [the] deed of trust and sale 
of the property." Id, (emphasis added). Although this letter was addressed to both Noel 
and Mary, Mary refused or failed to forward this letter to Noel. See id. In addition, Noel 
proffered exhibits and expert testimony that showed that "he had suffered some kind of 
damages" in that his credit score had dropped more than 100 points, his credit limits had 
been reduced by 99.2%, from $449,400 to $3,700, and his ability to refinance his own 
mortgage to a favorable interest rate had been significantly compromised. See 
Petitioner's Exhibits ##16, 20, 24, 30, 34, 37, 39, 44-45. As noted above, the court 
refused to consider any of this evidence. See generally R. 1116. 
The court also received exhibits from each party entitled "Statement of Account 
History," a computer printout summarizing the history of payments Mary made toward 
the Washington Federal mortgage from approximately December 2007 through January 
2010. See Respondent's Exhibit #3; Plaintiffs Exhibit ##32, 51. These exhibits make 
clear that Mary was late or missed every single payment during this two year period of 
time. See id. In fact, these exhibits make equally clear that Mary was sufficiently late on 
her monthly payments to incur a late fee for 18 of the 25 months during this two year 
period, including every single payment in 2008. See id. Mary's erratic payment history 
for this two-year period is as follows: 
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Payment Due Date 
December 1,2007 
January 1,2008 
February 1,2008 
March 1,2008 
April 1,2008 
May 1,2008 
June 1,2008 
July 1,2008 
August 1, 2008 
September 1,2008 
October 1,2008 
November 1,2008 
December 1,2008 
January 1,2009 
February 1,2009 
March 1,2009 
April 1,2009 
May 1,2009 
June 1,2009 
July 1,2009 
August 1,2009 
September 1,2009 
October 1,2009 
November 1,2009 
December 1,2009 
Date Payment Made 
December 26, 2007 
January 25, 2008 
February 29, 2008 
March 26, 2008 
April 25, 2008 
May 23, 2008 
July 3, 2008 
Duration of 
Delinquency (days) 
25 
24 
28 
25 
24 
22 
32* 
August 15, 2008 45* 
October 16, 2008 76* 
November 26, 2008 86* 
November 28, 2008 
November 28, 2008 
January 8, 2009 
January 12, 2009 
February 17, 2009 
March 5, 2009 
April 5, 2009 
June 5,2009** 
June 10,2009** 
July 10, 2009** 
August 11,2009** 
September 15,2009** 
October 29, 2009** 
December 9, 2009 
December 17, 2009 
58* 
27* 
38* 
11 
16 
4 
4 
35 
9 
9 
10 
14 
28 
38 
16 
Late Fee 
(> 15 days late) 
X 
X 
X 
! X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-
X 
-
-
X 
-
-
-
-
X 
X 
X 
Coincidentally or not, it was during this period of time that Noel's credit limits and credit score were 
primarily affected. 
Although Mary eventually set up an automatic payment plan with Washington Federal to "fix the 
problem," her automatic monthly payment was rejected for insufficient funds each month from May 
2009 through October 2009. 
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Shortly after conclusion of the much-abbreviated trial in this matter, the parties 
recognized that the trial court had failed to rule on Noel's petition to.modify. After 
bringing this failure to the court's attention, the court held a telephone conference that 
same day to resolve the petition to modify. Again the court refused to consider either 
party's evidence, ruling instead that it was also denying Noel's petition to modify 
because Mary's "delinquency in paying the mortgage on the marital home" does not 
constitute "a change in circumstances sufficient to modify the Decree of Divorce." R. 
1057. 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order 
Despite refusing to consider either party's evidence regarding the material factual 
dispute as to the extent of Mary's failure to pay the mortgage timely,4 the court made the 
following factual finding as its lone support for denying Noel's petition to modify: 
The Court finds that [Mary] failed to pay the June 2008 mortgage 
payment and it became a thirty (30) day rolling arrearage until it was 
paid in full in December 2008. The Court further finds that [Mary] 
was occasionally late in monthly payments thereafter until November 
2009 when all payments and fees were paid on the mortgage. 
R. 1336-37. The court then concluded that 
[b]ased upon the Court's rulings regarding the definition of "hold 
harmless," ... [Maryj's failure to make the June 2008 mortgage 
payment and the thirty (30) day rolling arrearage does not constitute a 
4
 Noel need not engage in a futile marshaling exercise because the trial court failed to 
consider any evidence and the factual findings, as framed by the court, are legally 
inadequate. See Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233,1f 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733; 
Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ^ 8 n.2, 983 P.2d 1103. 
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material or substantial change of circumstances that would justify the 
Court in revisiting the provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce 
which awarded [Mary] title and ownership of the home, the 
responsibility of making the first mortgage to Washington Federal, 
and to hold [Noel] harmless from the mortgage to Washington 
Federal. 
R. 1340, [^ 9 (emphasis in original).5 Noel objected to the above factual finding as 
contrary to the undisputed evidence presented to the court and as improperly mirroring 
Mary's interpretation of the evidence. SeeR. 1117-1205; 1262-1310. Specifically, Noel 
objected that this finding could not properly have been made because the court did not 
consider the parties' evidence regarding this dispute. See R. 1271. In pertinent part, the 
court denied these objections, concluding that the findings, conclusions, and order as 
drafted by Mary's counsel "accurately reflect the Court's rulings" and "are complete and 
stylistically appropriate." R. 1323. 
With respect to Noel's order to show cause, the court made the following factual 
findings: 
The Court finds that as of February 10, 2010, [Mary] has 
corrected all late and delinquent payments and the mortgage is 
current. 
The Court specifically finds that there are no foreclosure 
proceedings or actions by the mortgage holder, Washington Federal, 
against [Noel] or [Mary]. 
[Noel] concedes and the Court finds that [Noel] has not paid 
any monies for mortgage payments, late fees, foreclosure demands, 
penalties, or interest on the Washington Federal Savings & Loan as a 
result of [Mary]'s missed and late payments from June 2008 through 
The court made a substantively identical conclusion of law in paragraph 12 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See R. 1340, f 12. 
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December 2009 nor has Washington Federal demanded such payment 
from [Noel]. 
R. 1337. The court concluded that, "[a]s a matter of first impression, ... the meaning of 
'hold harmless' as it relates to paragraph 21 of the Amended Decree of Divorce in this 
matter requires [Mary] to hold [Noel] harmless from the payment of the first mortgage to 
Washington Federal Savings and Loan." Id. f 1 (emphasis in original); see also R. 
1338 f 4. The court also concluded, in several different ways, that the damages to Noel's 
finances are "extraordinarily speculative" as that term is used in Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 
UT 7, 227 P.3d 246. See R. 1337-40, f f 2, 3, & 8. The court then concluded that Noel's 
only remedy, in this situation and in the future should Mary again fail to pay the 
mortgage timely, is to pay the mortgage himself and then seek redress for his payments. 
See R. 1339-41, ^f 7, 13. Finally, the court concluded that Mary had not failed to hold 
Noel harmless from the Washington Federal mortgage because he had not paid any 
money to Washington Federal and, accordingly, denied Noel's request to hold Mary in 
contempt. See R. 1339-40, f f 6,10. 
Noel objected to these conclusions of law, arguing that they were duplicative, 
internally inconsistent, and contrary to and outside the evidence actually considered by 
the court. See R. 1269-72. In addition, Noel objected to these conclusions as 
substantively inaccurate and unconstitutional. See R. 1264-69. The court concluded that 
Noel's objections were "not well taken" and that the conclusions, findings, and order 
were accurate, complete, and appropriate. R. 1323. The court thus entered the findings, 
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conclusions, and order as drafted by Mary's counsel on or about June 3, 2010. See R. 
1331, 1341. Noel timely appealed. See R. 1346-48. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court both erred and abused its discretion in denying Noel's petition to 
modify because the trial court (1) refused to consider the parties' evidence, (2) failed to 
make factual findings regarding all material factual disputes, (3) made only one factual 
finding that is both clearly erroneous and legally inadequate, and (4) incorrectly 
determined that the un-contemplated material changes in the parties' circumstances were 
not "substantial." More specifically, even though Mary and Noel presented drastically 
different factual pictures to the court, the court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing or 
otherwise consider the parties' conflicting evidence regarding the extent of Mary's failure 
to pay the mortgage. This failure prevented the court from making factual findings on all 
the material factual disputes. And the lone factual finding made by the court is clearly 
erroneous because the undisputed evidence presented by both parties shows that Mary 
was late or missed every single payment over a two-year period of time, falling as much 
as three months behind on her mortgage during that time. Finally, the trial court abused 
its discretion in determining that the precipitous drop in Noel's credit and the 
corresponding half a million dollar reduction in his ready access to credit were not 
substantial enough to support modification of the parties' decree. Because the trial court 
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erred and abused its discretion, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of Noel's 
> petition to modify and remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
The trial court also abused its discretion by declining to hold Mary in contempt of 
court and, as a consequence, refusing to allow Noel to present evidence of and possibly 
recover for his damages resulting from Mary's failure to pay the mortgage timely. This 
abuse of discretion was based in part on two separate errors made by the trial court. First, 
the trial court made factual findings that are contrary to the evidence presented by the 
parties, which findings prejudiced Noel's ability to prosecute his case. Second, the trial 
court incorrectly interpreted the hold harmless provision in the parties' divorce decree to 
exclude any and all damages except those representing payments made directly to the 
mortgage holder. In doing so, the court concluded that Noel's loss of half a million 
dollars in credit and the ability to refinance his mortgage to a favorable rate do not 
constitute "harm" from which Mary was required to protect him. In arriving at this 
myopic and unprecedented definition of "hold harmless," the trial court refused to 
consider case law from sister jurisdictions and ignored the common sense reality that 
Noel unquestionably would have suffered much less "harm" if the bank had sought a 
$1300 mortgage payment from him then he did by losing the ability to refinance his own 
mortgage and the loss of access to over $400,000 in credit. Because the trial court's 
interpretation of "hold harmless" is incorrect and is based, at least in part, on clearly 
erroneous factual findings, the trial court's denial of Noel's request to hold Mary in 
contempt should be reversed and the matter remanded. Specifically, Noel should be 
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allowed to present any evidence he may have of damages, and should be entitled to a 
ruling as to whether his damages are recoverable under the proper interpretation of "hold 
harmless." 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Denial of Noel's Petition to Modify Should Be Reversed 
Because the Lone Factual Finding in Support is Clearly Erroneous and 
the Court Abused Its Discretion in Determining that No Substantial and 
Material Change in Circumstances Had Occurred. 
In domestic cases, Utah courts "ha[ve] continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders . . . for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (2010). To properly make such 
changes or new orders, however, the court must first determine that a substantial and 
material change in circumstances has occurred, which change was not contemplated at 
the time the original divorce decree was entered. See Wall v. Wall 2007 UT App 61, 
<P 1, 157 P.3d 341. Because such a determination is fact-intensive, ";[f]ailure of the trial 
court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the 
record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment."5 Connell v. Connell 2010 UT App 139, ^  39, 233 P.3d 836 (quoting Acton 
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)); see Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 
219, f^ 9, 983 P.2d 1103. And these "findings should be more than cursory statements; 
they must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
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steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id. (internal 
> quotation marks omitted). Finally, as a general rule, factual disputes "require a complete 
evidentiary hearing ... [unless the] dispute[ is] immaterial to the district court's 
decision." Robinson v. Robinson. 2010 UT App 96,114, 232 P.3d 1081. As discussed 
l 
in detail below, the trial court's denial of Noel's Petition to Modify Amended Decree of 
Divorce should be reversed because the court's lone factual finding in support is clearly 
erroneous and the court otherwise abused its discretion. 
A. The Trial Court's Lone Factual Finding is Clearly Erroneous Because the 
Great Weight of the Evidence Demonstrates that Mary Repeatedly Failed 
to Pay the Mortgage Timely for More Than Two Years. 
On the morning of trial, the trial court refused to consider either party's proffered 
evidence and denied Noel's motion for order to show cause as a matter of law, forgetting 
to rule on Noel's petition to modify. After being alerted as to this failure, the trial court 
held a brief telephone conference later that day to make its ruling. See R. 1057. The 
court again refused to consider the parties' respective evidence. See id. Despite 
refusing to consider any evidence, the trial court denied Noel's petition to modify, 
making only one factual finding in support: 
6
 Because the trial court did not consider any evidence, Noel need not undertake the 
burden of marshaling. See Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233,^[20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733 
(clarifying the marshaling requirement and stating that "[i]f there simply is no supportive 
evidence, counsel need only say so and the challenge [to the factual findings] will be 
well-taken—counsel is not expected to marshal the non-existent"); id (noting that "it is 
the trial court's singularly important mission to consider and weigh all the conflicting 
evidence and find the facts"). 
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The Court finds that [Mary] failed to pay the June 2008 mortgage 
payment and it became a thirty (30) day rolling arrearage until it was 
paid in full in December 2008. The Court further finds that [Mary] 
was occasionally late in monthly payments thereafter until November 
2009 when all payments and fees were paid on the mortgage. 
R. 1336-37. This factual finding is clearly erroneous because it is "in conflict with the 
great weight of the evidence." See Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, U 14, 217 
P.3d733. 
In support of their respective positions, each party presented the court with 
proffered exhibits entitled Statement of Account History, which are computer printouts 
detailing Mary's history of payments made toward the Washington Federal mortgage 
from approximately December 2007 through January 2010. See Respondent's Exhibit, 
#3; Plaintiffs Exhibits ##32, 51. These exhibits clearly evidence that Mary missed a 
mortgage payment in June 2008, as found by the court, because she did not make the 
June payment until July 3, 2008. See icL However, these exhibits also clearly evidence, 
in direct conflict to the court's finding, that Mary missed her mortgage payment in 
August 2008 (making the payment on October 16 ), September 2008 (making the 
payment on November 26th), October 2008 (making the payment on November 28th), and 
December 2008 (making the payment on January 9 ). See id. These exhibits also clearly 
evidence, contrary to the court's finding, that Mary missed or was late on every single 
payment from December 2008 through January 2010. See id. In addition, Mary's 
mortgage payments were returned for insufficient funds in the months of June, July, 
August, September, and October 2009. See kL And finally, rather than substantiate that 
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Mary brought her payments current in November 2009, as found by the court, these 
exhibits actually evidence that Mary missed the November 2009 payment, failing to 
make the payment until December 9, 2009. See id. Accordingly, even the most cursory 
review of the parties' proffered evidence clearly demonstrates that Mary missed more 
than the June 2008 mortgage payment and that she was significantly more than 
"occasionally late in monthly payments thereafter." 
In addition, Mary provided the court with a demand letter from Washington 
Federal dated November 3, 2008, clearly stating that Mary was more than $4,000 behind 
on her mortgage at that time because she had ufail[ed] to remit the September and 
October [2008 mortgage] payments." See Respondent's Exhibit #6. In other words, 
according to Washington Federal, Mary had missed more than her June 2008 mortgage 
payment. This letter also explained that, due to Mary's severe delinquency, Washington 
Federal was considering "acceleration of the sums secured by [the] deed of trust and sale 
of the property." Id. Although this letter was addressed to Noel C. Gardner, it was sent 
only to Mary's residence, see id., and Mary failed or refused to forward this letter to 
Noel, see R. 1362, f«[[ 18-19. Consequently, Noel was unable to take the necessary steps 
in order to attempt to mitigate any damage to his interests as a result of Mary's 
delinquency. Of note, Mary did not make either the September or October mortgage 
payment until three weeks after Washington Federal sent this demand letter, such that the 
September 2008 mortgage payment was nearly three months late by the time it was 
finally made. See Respondent's Exhibit # 3. This nearly 90-day delinquent payment 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cannot, under even the most tortured interpretation of the phrase, constitute a "thirty (30) 
day rolling arrearage." See R. 1336-37. 
In sum, the evidence presented by both parties clearly preponderates against the 
court's lone factual finding in support of its denial because the evidence demonstrates 
that Mary repeatedly failed to pay the mortgage timely for more than two years, 
occasionally falling as much as three months behind in her payments. It is almost certain 
that the trial court's failure to consider the undisputed evidence presented by the parties 
directly led to the trial court's very limited and clearly erroneous factual finding. 
Regardless, because the trial court's lone factual finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence or otherwise resulted from a definite mistake, this court should reverse the trial 
court's determination and remand for further proceedings as are necessary. See Kimball 
2009 UTApp 233,^14. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion Because Mary's Repeated Failure 
to Pay the Mortgage Timely, Her Failure or Refusal to Forward the 
Demand Letters to Noel, and the Significant Damage to Noel's Credit 
Constitute Substantial and Material Changes in the Parties' 
Circumstances Not Contemplated at the Time of the Divorce. 
As stated above, a trial court has the authority to modify a decree of divorce if the 
requesting party demonstrates that substantial and material changes in the parties' 
circumstances have occurred, which changes were not contemplated at the time of the 
divorce. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (2010); Wall v. Wall 2007 UT App 61,111, 
157 P.3d 341. Although a trial court has broad discretion in making this determination, 
the court's discretion must be exercised "within the bounds and under the standards ... 
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set" by the appellate courts. Connell v. ConnelL 2010 UT App 139, ^ 5, 233 P.3d 836. 
In particular, this court will reverse the trial court's determination that no substantial and 
material change in circumstances has occurred if convinced that there has been "a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 
1, f^ 6, 203 P.3d 1020 (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, because changed 
circumstances will, by definition, not be found in the original trial record, it is axiomatic 
that a trial court must consider each party's evidence and make factual findings regarding 
each material factual dispute in order to properly determine whether a substantial and 
material change in circumstances has occurred sufficient to warrant modifying the 
parties' divorce decree. See Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, If 14, 232 P.3d 
1081. In other words, "a district court exceeds its permitted discretion when it fails to 
make findings establishing an adequate and reviewable basis for its [decision]." Arnold 
v. Arnold 2008 UT App 17.11L 177 P.3d 89. 
To be clear, Noel's petition sought modification of the parties' divorce decree with 
respect to the provisions awarding Mary ownership of the marital home subject to her 
assumption of, payment toward, and agreement to hold Noel harmless from the 
Washington Federal mortgage. In practical terms, Noel's petition sought simply to 
remove his name from the Washington Federal mortgage, regardless of how that 
occurred, because Mary's repeated failure to pay the mortgage timely had directly and 
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severely damaged his personal and business finances. Although the severity of Mary's 
failure to pay the mortgage timely and the extent and cause of the damage to Noel's 
finances were both vigorously disputed, the trial court refused to allow the parties to 
present any evidence regarding these disputes. Notwithstanding, the trial court made the 
following legal conclusion in denying Noel's petition to modify: 
Based upon the Court's rulings regarding the definition of "hold 
harmless," the Court concludes that [Mary's] failure to make the June 
2008 payment and the thirty (30) day rolling arrearage does not 
constitute a material or substantial change of circumstances that 
would justify the Court in revisiting the provisions of the Amended 
Decree of Divorce which awarded [Mary] title and ownership of the 
home, the responsibility of making the first mortgage to Washington 
Federal, and to hold [Noel] harmless from the mortgage to 
Washington Federal.7 
R. 1340, % 9 (emphasis in original). The trial "Court's rulings regarding the definition 
of 'hold harmless'" primarily address the court's legal determination, made without 
regard to the parties' evidence, that the severe damage to Noel's credit is "extraordinarily 
speculative": these rulings address none of the factors necessary to properly evaluate a 
petition to modify. See R. 1337-41. 
n 
It should be noted that the trial court made a substantively identical conclusion of law 
in paragraph 12 of its Conclusions of Law. See R. 1340, f 12. The trial court rejected 
Noel's several attempts to clarify this seemingly unnecessary and confusing duplication, 
ultimately concluding that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law "accurately 
reflect the Court's rulings" and "are complete and stylistically appropriate." R. 1323; see 
R. 1257-61; see also R. 1269-70 (detailing Noel's objections to these paragraphs). 
Because Noel is still unable to glean a meaningful distinction from paragraphs 9 and 12 
of the Conclusions of Law, he cites only to paragraph 9. 
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By itself, the trial court's failure to consider each party's evidence with respect to 
the material factual disputes constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. Cf. 
Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, U 14 (noting that material factual disputes cannot be 
properly resolved absent a full evidentiary hearing); Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, If 6 
(clarifying that a misapplication of the law is an abuse of discretion). However, the trial 
court also failed to make factual findings regarding all material factual disputes, making 
only one clearly erroneous finding. See supra, Argument § 1(A). Specifically, the court 
failed to make a finding regarding whether any of the changes were contemplated at the 
time of the divorce, and also failed to make findings regarding whether the following 
constituted substantial and material changes: (1) Mary's failure to forward the 
Washington Federal demand letters to Noel so that he may protect himself; (2) the drastic 
reduction in Noel's personal and business credit; and (3) the fact that Noel now has two 
minor children, one of whom has a developmental disability and may never be capable of 
living on her own. The trial court's failures to consider the parties' disputed evidence 
and to "make findings establishing an adequate and reviewable basis for its [decision]" 
each constitute an abuse of the court's discretion warranting reversal of the trial court's 
denial of Noel's petition to modify. See Arnold, 2008 UT App 17, f 11 
In addition, reversal is required because the trial court's underlying determination 
that no substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred is directly contrary 
to the weight of the evidence and leads to a seriously inequitable result. See Jensen, 2009 
UT App 1, Tf 6. Specifically, the record makes clear that Noel proffered sufficient 
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evidence to demonstrate changes in the parties' circumstances have occurred, which 
changes are (1) substantial, (2) material, and (3) not contemplated at the time of the 
parties' divorce. See Wall, 2007 UT App 61, j^l 1. 
As an initial matter, Mary conceded in her deposition that she did not contemplate 
being late on the Washington Federal mortgage at the time she and Noel were divorced. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit # 14, pgs. 108-12. This concession is supported by the fact that 
"both the divorce decree and the [trial] record are bereft of any reference to" the fact that 
Mary would, at a later date, consistently fail to pay the mortgage timely. See id. |^ 12 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because this change was not contemplated, it also 
could not have been contemplated that Mary would fail or refuse to provide Noel with the 
resulting demand letters from Washington Federal or that Noel would suffer significant 
damage to his personal and business finances as a result of Mary's unforeseen failures to 
pay. Further, the fact that Noel and his current wife have a developmentally disabled 
child who may never live independently certainly cannot have been contemplated at the 
time of the parties' divorce. Accordingly, none of these changes in the parties' 
circumstances were contemplated at the time of their divorce. 
It is equally clear that these changed circumstances are material to the provisions 
of the divorce decree Noel sought to modify because they are "the kind of circumstances 
on which [the] earlier ... decision was based." Siee Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ]f 
15, 221 P.3d 888 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), cert, granted 
2010 Utah LEXIS 19 (Utah, Jan. 20, 2010). The trial court's original order reflected a 
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delicate balancing of the parties' rights and responsibilities with respect to the 
> Washington Federal mortgage, based largely on the parties' respective abilities to earn 
income and their drastically different financial philosophies. The trial court's balancing 
is most clearly reflected in the court's determination that Mary should receive the home 
free and clear of any claim by Noel with a correlative obligation that Mary assume, pay, 
and hold Noel harmless from the Washington Federal mortgage. See R. 238, 246. With 
the exception of the birth of Noel's new child, each of Noel's proffered circumstances 
relate directly to this balance between the parties' respective rights and obligations with 
respect to the Washington Federal mortgage. In particular, because Noel is an 
independent consultant the demolition of his credit not only materially affected his 
personal financial stability, but also materially hindered his ability to operate his business 
so that he could provide for his family. And the fact that Noel now has an additional 
child, for which he will likely need to provide permanent care, is unquestionably material 
to Noel's ability to afford to remain tied to Mary's increasingly delinquent mortgage. Put 
bluntly, it would be nonsensical if the continual non-payment of an obligation and the 
resultant financial consequences of this non-payment were considered immaterial to the 
underlying obligation itself. 
Because the changes in the parties' circumstances are material and were not 
contemplated at the time of their divorce, the trial court's denial of Noel's petition to 
modify must be read as a determination that the changed circumstances were not 
substantial. Pertinent to this appeal, "substantial" is commonly defined as "considerable 
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in quantity: significantly great." Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial. It is not readily apparent how 
the court could properly make the determination that the asserted changes were "not 
substantial" when it failed to consider the parties' evidence. Regardless, the proffered 
evidence clearly demonstrated that these changes were both "considerable in quantity" 
and "significantly great." 
First, Mary failed or refused to make the mortgage payment timely for over two 
years, falling behind up to three months on her monthly payment during that time and 
finally correcting the deficiencies on the exact day the trial was to commence. See 
Respondent's Exhibit #3 (showing that Mary's December 2009 mortgage payment 
was made on December 17, 2009); R. 834 (notifying the parties that trial was 
scheduled for December 17, 2009). In fact, at the time Mary requested continuance of 
the trial date—-just one week prior to trial—she was two months behind on the mortgage 
payment. See Respondent's Exhibit #3 (noting that Mary's November 2009 
mortgage payment was made on December 9, 2009); R. 844-49 (establishing that her 
motion to continue was filed on December 9, 2009). Of note, Mary's primary reasons 
for requesting a continuance of the trial were that she had been financially struggling for 
the prior three to four months and that she had very recently been placed under even 
greater financial distress. See R. 850-53. According to Mary herself, the financial 
changes in her life during this period of time were so significant that they were taking a 
substantial toll on her health and well-being, clarifying that even the "various 
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medications" she had been prescribed for "high anxiety, ... inability to sleep, ... [and] 
I loss of weight and appetite" had "only been mildly effective." R. 851. 
Second, regardless of the extent of Mary's financial struggles and her failings with 
respect to the Washington Federal mortgage during this 24-month span, it is undisputed 
that Noel suffered significant damage to his personal and business credit during that same 
time period. In fact, during a period of less than four (4) months from October 2008 
> through January 2009, Noel's ready access to credit was reduced by 99.2%, from 
$449,400 to $3,700. In addition, Noel's credit score was damaged so significantly that he 
was unable to refinance his own mortgage to a more favorable interest rate, missing out 
on potential savings of hundreds of thousands of dollars over the life of his own 
mortgage. Noel was also unable to capitalize on a business opportunity to become a 
partner in a mental health clinic during this time because he lacked sufficient credit to do 
so. More to the point, if a 99.2% (half a million dollar) reduction in credit is not a 
"substantial" change, it is uncertain what change would be substantial. Would a 99.5% 
reduction be substantial? What about a 100% reduction? And what if Noel had lost 
access to one million dollars in credit? Two million? Ten million? The only logical 
answer has to be that all of these losses, including those undisputedly suffered by Noel, 
o 
are "substantial." 
8
 It must be noted that Mary's failure or refusal to provide Noel with notice of the 
Washington Federal demand letter prevented Noel from taking steps to mitigate the 
damage to his personal and business finances, making his losses even more substantial. 
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To clarify (and briefly digress), although Mary did not dispute that Noel has 
actually suffered these losses, she sought to argue that her failure to pay the mortgage 
timely had not been the cause of these losses. Genuine as this position may be, Utah law 
requires only a showing that the parties' circumstances have substantially and materially 
changed since the divorce, regardless of which party is the "cause" of the change. See 
Wall v. Wall 2007 UT App 61, ^[11, 157 P.3d 341; Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (2010). 
In any event, Mary likely should have been afforded the full opportunity to present 
evidence to the trial court demonstrating that Noel's half a million dollar loss in credit 
was merely coincidental to her simultaneous untimely payments on their joint obligation 
for more than two years. The trial court denied both Noel and Mary the opportunity to 
present their full case for adjudication on the merits both at trial and again during the 
telephone conference to belatedly rule on Noel's petition to modify. This repeated 
refusal to allow the parties to present their cases cannot be remedied by simply 
concluding, as the trial court did, that Mary's evidence, had it been considered, would 
have carried the day. 
Finally, equity and public policy support the conclusion that the trial court's 
decision should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. In addition to the aforementioned 
substantial and material changes, the court was presented with the following equitable 
factors: (1) the parties have been divorced for over 16 years; (2) the parties' children are 
now ages 22 and 25, such that there are no longer minor children living with Mary in the 
home; (3) although the divorce decree contemplated Mary would eventually return to 
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part-time work, she is now working full-time and earns approximately $ 100,000 
i annually; and (4) Mary now has nearly five times the equity in her home as she did at the 
time of the parties' divorce and the mortgage balance owing to Washington Federal is 
reduced to only $100,000. These equitable factors demonstrate that none of the reasons 
) 
for the entry of the original order—namely, to allow Mary and the minor children to stay 
in the marital home even though Mary was then financially unable to support herself— 
1
 exist to justify draconian adherence to the original order. Public policy also dictates that 
the parties' decree should be modified because the court's decision, as it stands, 
essentially gives Mary the court's blessing to consistently make her mortgage payment as 
late as she would like knowing that Noel has no legal recourse unless and until he is 
forced to "pay" anything to the mortgage holder. Put another way, there is little else that 
Mary can do to damage Noel's personal and business finances, and the court's ruling 
unintentionally conveys the message that the court is unwilling or unable to stop her from 
doing so. The trial court's decision must be reversed so that Noel can have a remedy for 
the injury he has undoubtedly suffered. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 (providing that 
"every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law"). 
In sum, when the equitable factors and policy concerns are considered, together 
with the substantial and material changes in the parties' circumstances, the trial court's 
failure to consider the parties' evidence regarding the material factual disputes, and the 
trial court's inadequate and clearly erroneous factual finding, the only logical conclusion 
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is that the trial court's denial of Noel's petition to modify is not only against the weight 
of the evidence but also produced a seriously inequitable result. Because the trial court 
abused its discretion, this court should reverse the denial of Noel's petition to modify and 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Jensen 
v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, K 6, 203 P.3d 1020. 
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying NoePs Request to Hold 
Mary in Contempt of the Parties' Amended Decree of Divorce and, 
Consequently, for Failing to Award Him Damages Incurred as a Result of 
Her Contempt. 
Under Utah law, the "disobedience of any lawful judgment [or] order ... of the 
court" constitutes contempt of the court's authority. Utah Code Ann. § 786-6-301(5) 
(2008). Especially in the domestic context, a court is given broad discretion in fashioning 
a remedy for contempt, including imposition of sanctions against the contemnor such as 
fines and/or imprisonment, see icL § 78B-6-310, and ordering the contemnor "to pay the 
party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and 
expenses," idL § 78B-6-311. In order "[t]o find contempt, the [trial] court must find from 
clear and convincing proof that the contemnor knew what was required, had the ability to 
comply, and willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so."9 Marsh v. Marsh, 
9
 There is compelling authority to support the notion that a finding of intent or willfulness 
on the part of the contemnor is not a necessary predicate for the imposition of remedial, 
civil sanctions. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) ("The 
absence of willfulness does not relieve [an individual] from civil contempt. Civil as 
distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order 
of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of 
noncompliance. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the 
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1999 UT App 14, If 10, 973 P.2d 988 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mary 
was undisputedly under court order to hold Noel harmless from the Washington Federal 
mortgage, she had the financial ability to do so, and she failed or refused to do so, the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying Noel's request to hold Mary in contempt. See 
1411 8; Jensen v. Jensen. 2009 UT App 1, ^  6, 203 P.3d 1020 (clarifying that a 
misapplication of the law is an abuse of discretion). 
The trial court's abuse of discretion stems from several key mistakes. First, the 
trial court refused to consider the parties' evidence and, as a result, made factual findings 
that directly contradict the undisputed evidence, to Noel's severe prejudice. Second, the 
trial court erred in myopically interpreting the boilerplate hold harmless clause in the 
parties' divorce decree as including only a requirement that Mary pay the mortgage, 
regardless of whether she pays it untimely or causes Noel harm in doing so. Each of 
these errors will be addressed in turn below. 
defendant did the prohibited act." (citations omitted)); Gill v. Gill 718 P.2d 779, 781 
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) (citing McComb and concluding, contrary to 
the majority opinion, that the intent of the contemnor should be irrelevant); In re 
Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 93-94 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) (citing McComb, among 
other sources, in discussing distinction between criminal and civil contempt and in 
ultimately "concluding that] proof of willfulness is not required before a court may 
impose remedial contempt sanctions"). 
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A. The Trial Court's Factual Findings are Clearly Erroneous Because the 
Undisputed Evidence Showed that Washington Federal Demanded 
Payment from Noel in Order to Cure Default on and Avoid Foreclosure of 
the Mortgage. 
In support of its contempt determination, the trial court found that "[Noel] has not 
paid any monies for mortgage payments, late fees, foreclosure demands, penalties, or 
interest on the Washington Federal Savings & Loan as a result of [Mary]'s missed and 
late payments from June 2008 through December 2009 nor has Washington Federal 
demanded such payment from [Noel]." R. 1337 (emphasis added). This finding is 
clearly erroneous because it is against all of the evidence presented. See Kimball v. 
Kimball 2009 UT App 233,1f 14, 217 P.3d 733. 
Each party presented as an exhibit a demand letter from Washington Federal, 
dated November 3, 2008. See Petitioner's Exhibit #28; Respondent's Exhibit #6. This 
letter made clear that the mortgage loan was in default due to missed payments in 
September and October 2008; was subject to late fees, penalties, and interest; and was on 
the verge of foreclosure. See id. This letter also clearly demanded payment of these 
amounts from Noel. See id. And Noel would have made these payments, to avoid 
unnecessary damage to his and Mary's credit, had Mary only forwarded the letter to 
him.10 Regardless, the evidence proffered by both parties definitively establishes that 
Washington Federal demanded payment from Noel "for mortgage payments, late fees, ... 
penalties, [and] interest on the Washington Federal Savings & Loan as a result of 
It would be inequitable, to say the least, to allow Mary to avoid a finding of contempt 
for the simple reason that she hid her egregious failings from Noel. 
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[Mary]'s missed and late payments from June 2008 through December 2009." More to 
I the point, there is no evidence in the record to support the court's factual finding that 
"Washington Federal [did not] demand[] such payment from Noel." This clearly 
erroneous factual finding was also extremely prejudicial in that it foreclosed (pun 
l 
intended) Noel's opportunity to present evidence of and possibly recover for his damages 
that resulted from Mary's failure to pay the mortgage timely. See, e.g., Covey v. Covey, 
1
 2003UTApp380,^f21,80P.3d553. 
B. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Narrowly Interpreting the 
Hold Harmless Provision in the Parties' Amended Decree of Divorce to 
1
 Exclude Damages Suffered By Noel As a Direct Result of Mary's Failures 
to Pay the Mortgage Timely. 
The trial court erred in interpreting the hold harmless provision in the parties' 
divorce decree as requiring Mary to protect Noel only from the payment of the mortgage 
to Washington Federal. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, Tf 14, 48 P.3d 918 
(clarifying that an appellate court reviews for correctness a trial court's interpretation of a 
contract as a matter of law). Although no court in Utah has specifically addressed the 
issue of what damages are recoverable under a hold harmless provision in a divorce 
decree, there is ample case law dictating the general rules applicable to a trial court's 
interpretation of a provision in a divorce decree. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, *f 
18, 973 P.2d 431 ("[Courts] interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of 
contract interpretation."). "Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, [courts] 
look to the language of the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of the 
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contracting parties." Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ^ 25, 
207 P.3d 1235. "Where the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. And a 
court must apply the ordinary and usual meaning of the terms used in a disputed 
provision in a divorce decree in order to determine the parties' intent. See State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHerrera. 2006 UT App 388, ffl[ 7-10, 145 P.3d 1172. In 
addition, Utah appellate courts "have observed that contracts between spouses ... [to 
arrange property rights in the event of a divorce] are not necessarily judged on the same 
terms as contracts executed by persons operating at 'arm's length'" because of the 
intimacy and trust generally involved in that type of relationship. See Reese v. Reese, 
1999 UT 75, <[ 24, 984 P.2d 987. Accordingly, spouses contracting with one another are 
held to the highest degree of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of their 
contractual obligations under their agreement. See id. 
Due to the complexity of their marital and business finances, it took the parties 
three and a half (3 1/2 ) years of back and forth negotiations to arrive at a final Amended 
Decree of Divorce that adequately divided the marital estate and protected each party 
from the other. See R. 1-251. Of particular importance, the parties agreed that Mary 
should be awarded the marital home free and clear of any claim by Noel, subject to 
Mary's agreement "to assume and pay and hold [Noel] harmless from ... the first 
mortgage on the [marital] home to Washington Federal." R. 246 (emphasis added). 
40 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rather than interpret this provision according to its plain language, the trial court 
> modified the language negotiated by the parties and erroneously interpreted this provision 
to include only an obligation that Mary "hold [Noel] harmless from the payment of the 
first mortgage to Washington Federal."11 R. 1337 (emphasis added). The trial court's 
insertion of the phrase "the payment o f into the hold harmless clause in the parties' 
divorce decree inappropriately narrowed the scope of the terms negotiated by the parties, 
and thus cannot be allowed. Cf Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, % 25 (clarifying that the parties' 
intent must be determined from the plain language of the contract, absent a demonstration 
of facial ambiguity). Had the parties wished to restrict Mary's obligation to protect Noel 
they easily could have done so, much as the trial court did, by inserting "the payment of" 
into this clause. They chose not to, however, and the trial court cannot rewrite the 
parties' decree, even under the guise of interpretation, to render a bargained-for and 
explicit right meaningless. See id. 1f 33. Instead, the trial court should have applied the 
usual and ordinary meaning of the term "hold harmless" in interpreting the parties' 
decree. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "hold harmless" as "[t]o absolve (another party) 
from any responsibility for damage or other liability arising from the transaction." 
Black's Law Dictionary 737 (7th ed. 1999). The use of the word "any" in this definition 
11
 Interestingly, the trial court explicitly excluded damage to Noel's credit while 
implicitly allowing him to recover damages suffered if the Washington Federal mortgage 
goes into foreclosure. See R. 1337-38. Because Noel has no equity in Mary's home, 
however, the only damage that he would suffer through a foreclosure is damage to his 
credit, which the court concluded is not recoverable as too speculative. See R. 1339-40. 
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denotes a sense of totality; that the party ordered to hold the other harmless is responsible 
for all damage arising from the particular transaction. This makes common sense as well, 
especially when considered with the pertinent lay definitions of "hold" and "harmless" 
which, read together, describe a similar obligation to prevent the other party from all 
related harm or injury. See Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary (defining "hold" as "to prevent from some action," and 
"harmless" as "free from harm, liability, or loss"). Under both the legal and lay 
definitions, it is clear that a party ordered to hold another harmless from an obligation has 
the responsibility to prevent or compensate for all damage or other liability "arising from 
the transaction."12 Thus, the proper interpretation of the hold harmless provision in this 
matter, according to the plain meaning of the terms used, is that Mary was required to 
protect Noel from or compensate him for all damage or liability arising "from ... the first 
mortgage on the [marital] home to Washington Federal." R. 246. 
This proper interpretation is also supported by public policy concerns. Utah law 
strongly encourages divorcing parties to attempt to settle their disputes among themselves 
in order to "reduce the time and tensions associated with obtaining a divorce." Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-39(1) (2008) (requiring parties to a divorce to "participate in good 
faith in at least one session of mediation"). In the typical divorce, allocating marital 
debts and assets between the parties is one of the biggest obstacles to settlement and the 
"The term 'arising out of is ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident 
to, or in connection with the [transaction] in question." Meadow Valley Contrs., Inc. v. 
Transcon. Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 190, ^ 14, 27 P.3d 594. 
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marital home typically represents both the largest marital asset and obligation. Because 
> the marital home is indivisible (unless the parties are wealthy enough to offset the 
mortgage completely with an equivalent property distribution), quite often one party is 
awarded the marital home while the other is protected from the obligation on the home 
through inclusion of a "hold harmless" provision. In addition to conserving the marital 
resources, an arrangement such as this typically provides the financially vulnerable 
)
 spouse with a place to live (and typically raise the children) while simultaneously 
protecting the other spouse from the reality of their future, independent financial lives. 
Divorce practitioners routinely include a "hold harmless" provision, much as the one 
used in this case, in their divorce decrees because of the broad protection offered for the 
party who remains liable on the underlying mortgage but has no other interest in the 
home. Cf Russ v. Woodside Homes. 905 P.2d 901, 905-06 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (noting 
that the broad purpose of a hold harmless provision is to "relieve one party from the risk 
of loss or injury in a particular transaction or occurrence" and concluding that recovery 
for negligence was barred under the particular hold harmless provision even though the 
provision made no mention of "negligence"). The trial court's ruling, if affirmed by this 
court, will not only fundamentally alter the bargained-for protection in tens of thousands 
of outstanding divorce decrees that contain hold harmless provisions but will almost 
certainly dissuade divorce practitioners from recommending or including "hold harmless" 
provisions in future divorce decrees. Without this tool at their disposal, divorcing 
spouses will be far less likely to settle property distribution claims. 
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Along a similar vein, affirming the trial court's ruling would necessarily ratify 
Mary's argument that although she has an obligation to pay the mortgage, she has no 
obligation to do so timely or in a way that would avoid harming Noel. This is contrary to 
the public policy of ensuring that spouses contracting with one another act with the 
utmost good faith and fair dealing. See Reese, 1999 UT 75, ^  24. The Court of Appeals 
of Tennessee has addressed this precise issue in Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), and the analysis therein is instructive. The Long court was faced 
with a contempt petition seeking enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement 
incorporated into the parties' divorce decree that "awarded Mr. Long the martial 
residence and directed him to hold Ms. McAllister Long harmless for the indebtedness on 
the property."13 Id. at *6. The trial court dismissed Ms. McAllister-Long's petition 
because it concluded that the hold harmless provision "did not require [Mr. Long] to 
make the[ required] payments in a timely manner." Id. at *7. On appeal, the Long court 
discussed at length the proper interpretation of a hold harmless provision and emphasized 
that divorcing parties entering into a separation agreement are "held to the highest 
standards of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of their contractual 
obligations." Id. at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Long court 
reversed the trial court's dismissal, concluding that 
The hold harmless provision in the Long case states simply that because Mr. Long is 
awarded the home he agrees "to hold ... [Ms. McAllister-Long] harmless for the same." 
221 S.W.3d 1, *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The hold harmless provision in this appeal is 
substantively identical: Mary agreed to "assume and pay and hold [Noel] harmless from 
... the first mortgage on the [marital] home to Washington Federal." R. 246. 
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[bjecause the marital dissolution agreement obligates Mr. Long to 
deal with Ms. McAllister-Long fairly and in good faith, his "hold 
I harmless" obligation arose before the parties' creditors required Ms. 
McAllister-Long to pay the debts that had been assigned to Mr. Long. 
The agreement required Mr. Long to pay these debts in a timely 
manner in order to prevent Ms. McAllister-Long from being harmed. 
Receiving dunning letters and risking adverse effects on her credit 
) rating are among the types of harm that entitle Ms. McAllister-Long 
to ask the trial court to enforce Mr. Long's obligations to pay the 
debts the marital dissolution agreement required him to pay. 
IdL at *12 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the injustice of the trial court's decision is evidenced by the complete lack 
of remedy provided to Noel. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 ("[E]very person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law."). It is undisputed that Noel suffered harm. Under the court's ruling, even if Noel 
had proven to a 100% certainty that Mary's actions had directly caused his harm he 
would be unable to get relief from the mortgage, either through contempt or a 
modification of the parties' decree. In other words, Noel must suffer this harm endlessly 
with no legal recourse. In an attempt to provide Noel with a remedy, the trial court 
concluded that if Noel "determines that mortgage payments to Washington Federal have 
not been made that there is nothing that prohibits rhim] from making those payments to 
protect himself and to redress repayments of those amounts by [Mary] in the hearing 
before the Court." R. 1341 (emphasis added). This limited remedy is legally 
inappropriate because it shifts the burden of the "hold harmless" provision from Mary to 
Noel, forcing Noel to use the "hold harmless" provision as a sword, rather than as a 
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shield.14 This remedy is also practically inadequate. If Noel makes the mortgage 
payment either before the payment is due or before it is considered "late," Noel cannot 
recover because Mary has not yet failed to hold him harmless under the court's narrow 
interpretation of that phrase. See R. 1116, pg. 26 (clarifying that it is "Ms. Gardner's 
duty, responsibility and obligation to pay the mortgage" and that Noel can only 
make payments if the payments aren't made). If he makes the payment after it is 
"late" and reported on his credit, he can only recover an insignificant amount of his 
damages because he will still be unable to recover for any damage to his credit. And if 
Mary hides her failure to pay the mortgage (as she did in this case) Noel may not be able 
to make a payment in time to save the home from foreclosure. Once the house is 
foreclosed upon, Noel's ability to recover for even his direct financial losses will be 
compromised because Mary may well be insolvent. 
In sum, because the trial court erred in narrowly interpreting the hold harmless 
provision in the parties' divorce decree to include only an obligation that Mary protect 
Noel from direct liability on the mortgage—excluding Mary's obligation to protect Noel 
from other damage arising from the mortgage—the denial of Noel's request to hold Mary 
in contempt of court should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. See Jensen v. Jensen, 
2009 UT App 1, f 6, 203 P.3d 1020. And Noel respectfully requests that this court 
14
 "Are the words 'indemnify' and 'hold harmless' synonymous? No. One is offensive 
and the other is defensive .... 'Indemnity' is an offensive right—a sword—allowing an 
indemnitee to seek indemnification. 'Hold harmless' is defensive: The right not to be 
bothered by the other party ...." Queen Villas Homeowners Ass'n. v. TCB Prop. Mgmt, 
56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 528, 534 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis in original). 
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provide the trial court with specific instructions for hearing this case on remand. 
> Notably, it is undisputed that Noel suffered harm. Therefore, the only question for the 
trial court to resolve under the proper interpretation of the hold harmless provision in the 
parties' divorce decree is whether Noel's demonstrated harm "arose from" Mary's failure 
to pay the mortgage timely. As a consequence, the trial court should be instructed to 
consider the parties' evidence and make a factual determination as to whether Noel's 
damages "arise from" Mary's failure to pay the Washington Federal mortgage timely. If 
Noel produces clear and convincing evidence that his damages do indeed "arise from" 
Mary's actions, the trial court should hold Mary in contempt of court and award Noel his 
reasonable damages incurred as a result, including but not limited to his reasonable 
attorney fees incurred both at trial and on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311; 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting the general rule that 
when a party who is awarded attorney fees at trial succeeds on appeal, he is entitled to his 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Noel respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
trial court's denial of his petition to modify because the trial court both erred as a matter 
of law and abused its discretion by failing to consider, properly weigh, and make 
adequate factual findings regarding the un-contemplated substantial and material changes 
in the parties' circumstances. Concomitantly, Noel respectfully requests that this court 
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reverse the trial court's denial of his request to hold Mary in contempt as an abuse of the 
court's discretion, and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to take 
evidence and determine whether Noel's demonstrated damages "arise from" Mary's 
repeated failure to pay the mortgage timely. 
Dated this 18th day of February, 2011. 
Mohrman & Schofield PC 
Michael K. Mohrman 
Tracy C. Schofield 
Mitchell S. Maio 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have caused to be hand-delivered an original and 
seven (7) copies, plus one digital courtesy copy per Utah Supreme Court Standing Order 
No. 8, of the foregoing instrument to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 
5l Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and that I have caused two (2) true and correct 
copies, plus one digital courtesy copy, of the foregoing instrument to be delivered as 
indicated below, on this 18th day of February, 2011, to the following: 
Paul H. Liapis 
Paul H. Liapis, L.C. 
175 West 200 South, #2004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
5<0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Electronic Facsimile 
( ) Electronic Mail 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -
Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -
Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care 
insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint 
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marria 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and 
regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the 
court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be 
adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child 
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider 
the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, 
the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule 
a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-
ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation 
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-
time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
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costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of 
the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in 
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of 
living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change 
in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the 
amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a mairriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substamtial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action, 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the 
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court maiy consider the income of a subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration, 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years 
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that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a 
) longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
\ annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establisliment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
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By. PAUL H. LIAPIS, USB #1956 '\ %$j'K'"' 
LIAPIS, GRAY & STEGALL \ &/' 
Third Floor, New York Buildi'h-g' 
48 Market Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 532-6996 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 8 199* 
SALTLAKfcCUUN/Y 
Deputy Clerk 
NOEL C. GARDNER 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
MARY H. GARDNER, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
C7V-.1 \ -->* t V O 
Vrv; 
Civil No. 914900261 DA 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
13th day of January, 1994, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, one 
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff, NOEL C. 
GARDNER, appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Sharon 
A. Donovan of DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN, and Defendant, MARY H. 
GARNDER, appearing in person and by and through her attorney, Paul 
H. Liapis, of LIAPIS, GRAY AND STEGALL, and counsels for both 
parties having met with the Court in chambers to advise the Court 
that the parties have resolved all of the issues in this matter and 
the agreement of the parties having been read into the record in the 
presence of both Plaintiff and Defendant, and Plaintiff and 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
DECREE VDDECREE \/n .!7£ 
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Defendant having approved and confirmed said agreement, and 
Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, having agreed to withdraw his Complaint, 
and Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, having been duly sworn and examined 
on the basis of her Answer and Counterclaim, and the Court having 
reviewed the records and files herein, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and the Court having inquired into the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and the Court having made and entered herein its 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of 
Paul H. Liapis of LIAPIS, GRAY, & STEGALL, attorney for Defendant: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, be and she is hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, 
upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the marriage 
between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same is hereby dissolved, 
and the parties are hereby freed and absolutely released from the 
bonds of matrimony and all the obligations thereof, with said Decree 
to become final upon signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce 
herein. 
2. Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, be and she is hereby awarded 
the permanent and sole care, custody and control of the two (2) 
minor children of the parties: namely, Loren E., age 8, born 
September 6th, 1985, and Jeffrey C , age 5, July 21, 1988, subject 
2 
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to reasonable and liberal rights of visitation for the Defendant. 
Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to continue their pattern of 
effective and flexible visitation wherein Plaintiff visits with the 
children on Wednesday afternoon from 4:00 to 7:30 p.m. and every 
other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m. Both 
parties are expected and ordered to communicate with one another 
about any necessary changes to this visitation and provide to the 
other reasonable prior notice of any proposed changes. If the 
visitation arrangement should break down between the parties, then 
the specified visitation schedule, set forth in Section 30-3-35, 
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1993) should be implemented, and the 
parties are then ordered to give each other a minimum of 24 hours 
prior notice if certain visitation cannot or will not occur. 
Defendant be and she is hereby ordered to communicate with Plaintiff 
the important decisions concerning the children and shall supply 
Plaintiff with copies of report cards, information on major 
activities of the children, whether at school, sporting events, or 
social situations. Defendant is ordered to further communicate to 
Plaintiff the important educational, medical, and major decisions 
concerning the children, so that the Plaintiff can participate 
actively with the children. Defendant is to be the person who makes 
all of the final decisions as she is the custodial parent. 
Defendant be and she is hereby ordered further give to the Plaintiff 
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a minimum of sixty (60) days prior notice if she intends to leave 
the State of Utah and relocate to another state. 
3. Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, be and she is hereby ordered 
be awarded the home of the parties located at 3471 East 7635 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, and free 
and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff, and subject to her 
assumption of the first mortgage to Washington Federal Savings and 
Loan and said property is more particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point which is North 0°03,40M West 1087.25 
feet and South 89°35'40" West 146.30 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence 
South 89°35'4 0" West 8 0.0 feet; thence North 0°03'40" West 
137.25 feet; thence North 89°35'40" East 80.0 feet; thence 
South 0°03'40,! East 137.25 feet to the point of beginning. 
Situate is Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Parcel No. 22-26-478-019-0000 
Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to immediately quit-claim his 
interest in the home to the Defendant. 
4. Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, be and he is hereby awarded as 
his sole and separate property, his TIAA-CREF Retirement Account 
with the University of Utah, the furnitures, furnishings, and 
appliances currently in his possession, his leased 1994 Chrysler 
Concorde automobile, his University of Utah Credit Union Checking 
Account Nos. 71655-6-9 and 71655-6-1, his First Security Bank 
Checking Account Nos. 061-10269-56 and 061-10267-33, his U.C.L.A. 
4 
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Credit Union Account No. 41415-98465, his one-half (1/2) interest in 
the Gardner Mental Wellness Systems, including the First Security 
Bank Account No. 061-00097-14, all of his accounts receivable 
balances accumulated through his professional corporation and from 
his forensic work, the antique Victrola, the antique dresser from 
the guest room, his stereo system and rack with all components, his 
Walkman (if it can be located) , the exercise stepper, the power 
drill and saw, one-half (1/2) of the tools, his remaining personal 
clothing in the home, a division of the family photos and/or copies, 
a division of the books of the parties, the computer and printer 
currently in his possession, and his personal effects and 
belongings. Plaintiff be and he is hereby also awarded ownership of 
the piano, which is currently in the family home, but said piano 
shall remain in the family home with the Defendant, to be used by 
the children. 
5. Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, be and she is hereby awarded 
as her sole and separate property, all of the equity in her 1992 
Camry XLE automobile, and the obligation thereon, all of the 
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances in the family home, 
(with the exception of those items specifically enumerated in 
Paragraph B, above), her University of Utah Credit Union Checking 
and Savings Accounts No. 705021, her pre-marital items of furniture, 
and personal effects and belongings. As noted above, the piano will 
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remain in the family home with the Defendant for use by the 
children. 
6. Plaintiff and Defendant own a one-half (1/2) interest in 
the business known as the Mental Wellness Center, at Holy Cross, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Gardner Mental Wellness Systems, Inc., 
and said business closed operation on the 13th of November, 1993. 
The remaining one-half (1/2) interest is owned by the Plaintiff's 
brother, Robert Gardner. Upon closing, the business held hard 
assets including, but not limited to, furniture, a telephone system, 
a copier, day care equipment, computer, and accounts receivable. 
The business also had debts and obligations to First Security Bank 
for a furniture lease and equipment loan, cash advances from Holy 
Cross Hospital, a First Security Bank Credit Line, Zion's Bank 
computer lease loan, and a Note payable to Holy Cross in the sum of 
$15 0,000.00. The Court also notes that the repayment of the 
$150,000.00 Note to Holy Cross Hospital is currently at issue, given 
the closing of the Mental Wellness Center, and the sale of Holy 
Cross Hospital to the Hospital Trust Corporation of America. 
7. Plaintiff and Defendant, representing their one-half (1/2) 
interest, and the Plaintiff's brother, Robert Gardner one-half (1/2) 
interest, be and they are hereby ordered to continue to collect all 
of the accounts receivable, to sublet the leased premises, to 
liquidate, rent and/or sale any and all of the assets owned by the 
Wellness Center in an attempt to liquidate the debts and obligations 
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of the said business. All income realized from their efforts, 
including, but not limited to, collection of accounts receivables, 
collection of rents, and rental income from the office equipment, 
and any other type of income shall be collected and deposited into 
the bank accounts of the Mental Wellness Systems for payment of 
their outstanding debts and obligations. Plaintiff and Defendant be 
and they are hereby ordered to expedite payment of their outstanding 
debts and obligations including the Note Receivable, believed to be 
owed to the Plaintiff, Dr. Noel Gardner, the furniture lease, the 
equipment loan, the credit line loan, the computer lease loan and 
the loan advance from Holy Cross Hospital from these collected 
proceeds. 
8. The parties shall immediately determine whether the Note 
Receivable in the sum of Five Thousand Six Hundred Forty-four and 
28/100 Dollars ($5,644.28) is owed to the Plaintiff, Dr. Noel 
Gardner, and if so, the Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are 
hereby each awarded one-half (1/2) of said note as soon as the same 
can be paid by the business. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to determine whether 
or not the Wellness Center shall be required to repay or pay a 
compromise sum of the $150,000 Note owing to Holy Cross Hospital at 
the earliest possible time. If it is determined that there is to be 
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compromise payment or no payment at all, of monies from the Wellness 
Center toward this debt and there aire then monies and/or assets left 
in the accounts of the Wellness Center, Plaintiff and Defendant be 
and are each hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of their one-half (1/2) 
interest in the remaining monies and assets in this account. The 
Court also orders that if there are any tax consequences resulting 
from the non-payment or compromise payment of this loan, that said 
tax obligation should be first paid from the business assets before 
any division of the net assets or payment of monies to Robert 
Gardner. 
10. Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered give Defendant an 
accounting of all assets, collections, income, rentals, debt 
payment, and accountings from November 13, 1993 through December 31, 
1993. Thereafter, Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to give to 
Defendant monthly accountings at the end of January, February and 
March, 1994, and accountings thereaifter on a quarterly basis. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant aire to agree upon an hourly rate 
and number of hours, to be allowed Plaintiff's brother, Robert 
Gardner, to continue in his efforts to collect the accounts 
receivable, collect and secure rentals, and to pay the debts and 
obligations of the Wellness Center. The parties are ordered to use 
the information from Mr. Steve Nicolatus to determine reasonable 
hours compensation for Robert Gardner's services during the 
8 
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liquidation process. At the conclusion of this process should there 
be net monies in the Wellness Center, Plaintiff and Defendant are 
then to compensate Robert Gardner for his time at the agreed upon 
rate and before the division of any of the net proceeds in this 
matter. If at the end of the collection process there are not any 
net proceeds remaining to be divided between the parties, then any 
such compensation shall not be paid to Plaintiff's brother. 
12. At the conclusion of this collection process, if there are 
not any net proceeds remaining, but obligations due and owing on the 
debts, obligations, and the Promissory Note to Holy Cross, owed as 
of November 13, 1993, those obligations shall be assumed and paid 
solely by the Plaintiff and his brother, and Plaintiff be and he is 
hereby ordered to hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
13. Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, be and he is hereby ordered 
and required to pay to Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, the sum of 
$1,000.00 per child per month as child support, for a total of 
$2,000.00 per month, payable in two equal amounts on the 1st and 
15th days of each month, commencing the 1st day of February, 1994, 
and continuing thereafter until each child has attained the age of 
eighteen (18) years and has graduated from high school during each 
child's normal and expected year of graduation. The Court further 
notes and approves that there shall not be a reduction in this child 
support amount for the health insurance premiums, as they are 
currently paid through the Plaintiff's employment with the 
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University of Utah. The Court also notes and approves that this 
child support amount is greater than the amounts calculated under 
the Uniform Child Support Worksheet as the Plaintiff's income is at 
the top of the Uniform Child Support Worksheet, and the parties have 
agreed that the larger amount is needed to support the children at 
the standard they desire for the children. 
14. Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, be and he is hereby ordered 
and required to pay to Defendant, MARY H. GARDNER, the sum of 
$2,000.00 per month as alimony, payable in two equal sums on the 1st 
and 15th days of each month, commencing on the 1st day of February, 
1994, until such time as Defendant remarries, cohabits, dies, or 
until further order of the Court. 
15. For the month of January, 1994, Plaintiff be and he is 
hereby ordered to continue to pay the temporary alimony and child 
support as set forth in the Court's Temporary Order. 
16. Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, be and he is hereby ordered 
and required to maintain the current or comparable policy of health, 
accident, hospitalization, and dental insurance for the benefit of 
the two (2) minor children of the parties, for as long as the terms 
of this policy allows and up through the children's college 
education, if such coverage is so available. 
17. Plaintiff and Defendant be and they aire hereby ordered to 
each be responsible for one-half (1/2) of all deductible and such 
non-covered medical expenses for the children, including all 
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medical, dental, orthodontia, optometries, and psychological 
expenses, until such time as each child attains the age of twenty-
one (21) years, marries or becomes self-supporting. Defendant shall 
give to Plaintiff notification, in advance, of any non-emergency 
major expenses to be incurred for the children. 
18. Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARDNER, be and he is hereby ordered 
and required to maintain the life insurance policies presently in 
force on his life in the sum of $1,000,000.00, at a premium of $910 
per year, and is hereby ordered to name the Defendant, MARY H. 
GARDNER, and the two minor children of the parties as the primary, 
sole, and exclusive beneficiaries for the sum of $500,000.00. 
Defendant's beneficiary designation be and it is hereby ordered to 
continue until such time as she remarries, cohabits, or dies. The 
children's beneficiary designation be and is hereby ordered to 
continue until they attain the age of twenty-one (21) years, marry 
or become self-supporting. If the Defendant remarries prior to the 
time that the children have attained the age of twenty-one (21) 
years, have married or have become self-supporting, then the 
children be and they are hereby ordered to be named as the primary, 
sole, and exclusive beneficiaries on the entire $500,000.00 amount. 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded the right to choose the primary 
beneficiary on the remaining portion of this life insurance policy. 
11 
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19. Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to continue to 
maintain the newly acquired John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Policy No. F.V.-1150-3144391, in the sum of $150,000.00. Plaintiff 
be and he is hereby ordered to continue to make the premium payments 
thereon, so that the ongoing cash value will continue to accumulate 
for the use of the parties' minor children for their college 
education. 
20. Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered and required to 
assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless from the following 
debts and obligations: one-half (1/2) of the Defendant's non-covered 
and deductible amounts of the medical bills associated with her most 
recent surgery, his medical school loans with A.F.S.A., his 
obligation to Dr. Steven Marmer, his obligation to Cohne, Rappaport 
& Segal, his obligation to Dr. Christine Schneider, his Valley 
National car lease on his Concorde automobile, the First Security 
Business Line of Credit, his Premier Medical Group obligation, the 
obligation with Ultimate Electronics, any and all debts and 
obligations associated with the Gardner Wellness Center Systems, and 
the Mental Wellness Center, and all of his attorney fees and costs. 
21. Defendant be and she is hereby ordered and required to 
assume and pay and hold the Plaintiff harmless from the following 
debts and obligations: one-half (1/2) of her non-covered medical 
bills resulting from Defendant's most recent surgery, the first 
mortgage on the home to Washington Federal, the MasterCard in her 
12 
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name with Marine Midland New York, her Chemical Bank Visa, her 
Mervyn's account, the Mountain America auto loan for the purchase of 
her automobile, Dr. Fred Richards, and the loan from her aunt, 
Evelyn Roberts. 
22. Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are hereby ordered 
each to assume and pay those debts and obligations which they have 
incurred in their own name since filing of the Complaint in this 
matter shall be and is hereby ordered to hold the other party 
harmless therefrom. 
23 . The parties be and they are hereby ordered consult with a 
neutral C.P.A., to assess and determine the least costly and best 
way to file amended and current tax returns for the years 1991, 1992 
and 1993. The analysis of this C.P.A., shall be to determine what 
is best for both parties, rather than one individual party. If it 
is determined that the parties shall file joint tax returns for the 
years 1991, 1992 and 1993, and after appropriate credit is given to 
the Defendant for her one-half (1/2) of the 1990 tax refund, the 
parties be and they are hereby ordered to thereafter divide any 
liability on the joint tax return on the basis of their pro rata 
share of taxes to the total declared and based upon each party's 
calculation of their taxes on a separate return. In other words, 
the accountant is hereby ordered to determine the taxable 
consequence for each party on a separate return, and each party's 
share of taxes to the total amount of taxes due which will be the 
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basis for the pro rata determination. Plaintiff be and he is hereby 
ordered to assume and pay any and all penalties and interest against 
Defendant for any obligations owed on her 1992 tax return, if the 
parties file a separate return.. If the parties file separate tax 
returns for any of the above years, they are hereby ordered to 
assume and pay their separate tax obligations. 
24. Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded and allowed to claim 
the minor children of the parties as a tax exemption on all of his 
state and federal income tax returns, commencing with the year 1994. 
Defendant be and she is hereby ordered to sign the necessary IRS 
Form 8322, to allow Plaintiff to claim the two (2) minor children, 
as set forth herein, PROVIDED, that Plaintiff is current in the 
payment of any and all child support for each taxable year. 
25. The Plaintiff, NOEL C. GARNDER, be and he is hereby 
ordered to pay to Plaintiff, MARY H. GARDNER, attorneys' fees in the 
sum of $6,000.00, payable in a cash sum on or before the 15th day of 
February, 1994. The parties be and they is hereby ordered each 
assume and pay their own attorney's fees over and above this ordered 
amount and as incurred by each party in this matter. 
26. The Court hereby grants a waiver of the withhold and 
deliver provisions and orders the Plaintiff to pay directly to the 
Defendant the alimony and child support as more fully set forth in 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Decrees of Divorce. 
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27. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do and 
perform all the matters and things required by each of them to be 
done herein. .„~*~*r 
DATED this 2S day of ^H^i , 1994. 
BY THE JZtiURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF FIRST MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE by placing same in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 12 day of 
February, 1994, addressed to: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main Street, 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff^ 
/ J /) 
/ Qui li ^^--
CERTIFICATE OF SECOND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE by placing same in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 23RD day of March, 
1994, addressed to: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
D A R T , ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 Sou th Main S t r e e t , 
Suite 13 3 0 / ) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 / / /I 
( qjli % ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF THIRD MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE by placing same in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 4th day of May, 1994, 
addressed to: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 / 
i / 
-f 1 £ T 7 — / L" -" 
CERTIFICATE OF FOURTH HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a 
correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE on this 13th day of 
June, 1994, addressed to: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
D A R T , ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 /") 
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Third Judicial District 
M 0 3 2010 
PAUL H. LfAPIS, USB #1956 By__ __ rf^ 
PAUL H. LIAPIS, L.C. " " Deputy Ctork 
Attorney for Respondent 
175 West 200 South, Suite 2004 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
NOEL C GARDNER, 
vs. 
MARY H. GARDNER, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 914900261 
Honorable Paul G. Maughan 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and die Respondent's Reply to Petition to 
Modify Amended Decree of Divorce and Respondent's Counter Motion having come on regularly 
for trial before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan on February 10, 2010, Petitioner NOEL C. 
GARDNER appearing in person and by and through his attorneys of record, Michael K. Mohrman 
and Tracy C. Schofield of MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC, and the Respondent MARY H. 
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GARDNER appearing in person and by and through her attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis oi PAUL 
H. LIAPIS, LC, and the Court having initially entertained a dialogue, discussion, and questions to 
counsel with regards to the issues in this matter, and the Court having noted to the parties and 
counsels that it had reviewed each party's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, had 
reviewed each party's Trial Memorandum, had conducted research on its own as to this matter of 
first impression, namely, the definition of the "hold harmless" clause in the context of the divorce 
proceedings and how that definition applies to the "hold harmless" clause in the Amended Decree 
of Divorce, and the Court having heard the arguments and impressions of counsel for Petitioner and 
Respondent, and having reviewed the records and files herein and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court does now make, adopt, and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner NOEL C. GARDNER and Respondent MARY H. GARDNER were bona 
fide and actual residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months 
immediately prior to the filing of the Petition to Modify the Amended Decree of Divorce herein. 
2. Respondent MARY H. GARDNER was awarded an Amended Decree of Divorce 
from the Petitioner on June 28, 1994 pursuant to the parties' stipulated agreement. The Court finds 
the following paragraphs of the Amended Decree of Divorce are relevant to the issues before the 
Court: 
2 
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Paragraph 3: 
Defendant MARY H. GARDNER be and she is hereby ordered be awarded [sic] the 
home of the parties located at 3471 East 7635 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole 
and separate property, and free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff, and subject 
to her assumption of the first mortgage to Washington Federal Savings and Loan and 
said property is more particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point which is North 0°03'40" West 1087.25 feet and 
South 89°35f40" West 146.30 feet from the Southeast corner of 
Section 26, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence South 89°35,40" West 80.0 feet; thence 
North 0°03?40n West 137.25 feet; thence North 89°35'40M East 80.0 
feet; thence South 0°03'40n East 137.25 feet to the point of beginning. 
Situate is Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Parcel No. 22-26-478-019-000 
Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to immediately quit-claim his interest in the 
home to the Defendant. 
Paragraph 21: 
Defendant be and she is hereby ordered and required to assume and pay and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless from the following debts and obligations: one-half (Vi) of her non-
covered medical bills resulting from Defendant's most recent surgery, the first 
mortgage on the home to Washington Federal, the MasterCard in her name with 
Marine Midland New York, her Chemical Bank Visa, her Mervyn's account, the 
Mountain America auto loan for the purchase of her automobile, Dr. Fred Richards, 
and the loan from her aunt, Evelyn Roberts. 
3. The Court finds that Respondent failed to pay the June 2008 mortgage payment and 
it became a thirty (30) day rolling arrearage until it was paid in full in December 2008. The Court 
further finds that the Respondent was occasionally late in monthly payments thereafter until 
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November 2009 when all payments and fees were paid on the mortgage. 
4. The Court finds that as of February 10, 2010, the Respondent has corrected all late 
and delinquent payments and that the mortgage is current. 
5. The Court specifically finds that there are no foreclosure proceedings or actions by 
the mortgage holder, Washington Federal, against the Petitioner or Respondent. 
6. The Petitioner concedes and the Court finds that the Petitioner has not paid any 
monies for mortgage payments, late fees, foreclosure demands, penalties, or interest on the 
Washington Federal Savings & Loan as a result of the Respondent's missed and late payments from 
June 2008 through December 2009 nor has Washington Federal demanded such payment from the 
Petitioner. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Asa matter of first impression, the Court rules that the meaning of uhold harmless" 
as it relates to paragraph 21 of the Amended Decree of Divorce in this matter requires the 
Respondent to hold the Petitioner hamiless from the payment of the first mortgage to Washington 
Federal Savings and Loan. 
2. The Court's interpretation of the hold harmless provision is a question of law and is 
not impacted by the testimony of the parties. To allow the Petitioner to present evidence on how he 
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believes he has been damaged by the nonpayment of the June 2008 mortgage payment and the thirty-
day rolling mortgage arrearages thereafter, and his perception that such conduct is a breach of the 
"hold harmless" clause would be extraordinarily speculative and is denied. 
3. Based upon the Court's review of the recent ruling in the matter ofAshby vs. Ashby, 
649 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (SC, 2/10/10), the Court's concludes that the theory and ruling in that case 
on extraordinarily speculative matters is helpful in the analysis of its definition of "hold harmless" 
in this matter. The Court concludes that the Petitioner's theory and approach in this matter is just the 
opposite of the principle in the cases of Ashby vs. Ashby, (supra) and the case Martinez vs. Martinez, 
818 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1991). The Petitioner's action to come to this Court to present evidence 
on howr he perceives and claims to have been damaged by what he calls Respondent's failure to pay 
the June 2008 mortgage payment on her home and breaches or actions which he feels have not held 
him harmless, would be and is "extraordinarily speculative." The Court also concludes that any 
recovery to the extent that the Petitioner is seeking would be "extraordinarily speculative." 
4. The Court concludes and limits the "hold harmless" provision in this matter to this 
divorce and equitable proceedings, t o be limited to those damages that directly stem from 
Respondent's failure to meet her obligations on the Washington Federal mortgage for a period of 
time namely the late payments, foreclosure costs, penalties, interest, and for monies paid by 
Petitioner which he was not obligated or planning to pay. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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5. The Court has determined that the mortgage to Washington Federal Savings and Loan 
is current and that the Respondent has made all payments, penalties, late fees, and interest on this 
mortgage. 
6. The Co art has concluded that the Petitioner has not made any mortgage payments, 
late payments, penalties, fees, or interest for the Respondent and to Washington Federal Savings and 
Loans, that he has not been damaged in any manner and that Respondent has held Petitioner harmless 
in accordance with the terms of paragraph 21 of the Amended Decree of Divorce. The Court 
concludes that since Petitioner had not made any such payments, he is not entitled to an award of 
damages against the Respondent resulting from the missed June 2008 mortgage payment and the 
thirty (30) day rolling mortgage arrearage that accrued thereafter through November 2008. 
7. The Court concludes that if the Respondent had failed to make the mortgage 
payments and Petitioner felt he had not been held harmless from the mortgage that there was a 
remedy for the Petitioner to make the payments and to pursue a remedy of contempt or a remedy of 
reimbursement for the then actually incurred damages that Petitioner would have incurred by his 
payment of the mortgage or late fees against the Respondent. 
8. The Court concludes that it would be extraordinarily speculative to award the 
Petitioner damages for the alleged reduction in his credit score rating, the alleged reduction in the 
credit limit on his credit cards, the alleged suspension of his home equity line of credit, the alleged 
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loss of his ability to refinance his home, for the attorney fees incurred in this matter, and that he is 
not entitled to such an award, and his request is hereby denied. 
9. Based upon the Court' s rulings regarding the definition of "hold harmless," the Court 
concludes that the Respondent's failure to make the June 2008 payment and the thirty (30) day 
rolling arrearage does not constitute a material or substantial change of circumstances that would 
justify the Court in revisiting the provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce which awarded 
Respondent title and ownership of the home, the responsibility of making the first mortgage to 
Washington Federal, and to hold the Petitioner harmless from the mortgage to Washington Federal. 
10. The Court concludes that the Respondent has not failed to hold Petitioner harmless 
from the Washington Federal Savings and Loan first mortgage obligation, that the Petitioner is not 
entitled to a finding of contempt against the Respondent, and the same is hereby denied. 
11. The Court receives the Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 8 and 12 through 60 and 
Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 20 in this matter. 
12. Based upon the Court's conclusions of law defining the "hold harmless" clause, the 
Respondent's missed and/or late payment and the thirty (30) day rolling arrearage do not constitute 
a material and substantial change of circumstances that would justify the Court in revisiting the 
provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce awarding Respondent title and ownership of the home, 
responsibility for the assumption of the payment of the first mortgage to Washington Federal, and 
to hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
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13. The Court concludes that in the future if the Respondent fails to make ongoing 
payments to Washington Federal Savings and Loan and if Petitioner determines that mortgage 
payments to Washington Federal have not been made that there is nothing that prohibits Petitioner 
from making those payments to protect himself and to redress repayments of those amounts by 
Respondent in the hearing before the Court. 
14. The Court concludes that each party shall assume and pay their own attorney fees and 
costs with regards to the issues presented t the Court in the Petition to Modify and the Order to Show 
Cause brought by the Petitioner and the defenses and affirmative requests submitted by Respondent 
in this matter. 
DATED this _ _ 3 _ _ day ofMay 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
By: 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 18th day of February 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Schofield, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City UT 841 IV\ 
SECOND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 11th day of March 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Scho field, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
/ 
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THIRD CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 29T H day of March 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Schofield, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street/£m> 900 
Salt Lake City UT 841/11 
FOURTH CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 18th day of May 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Molirman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Schofield, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City UT 841IV 
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Third Judicial District 
M 0 3 2010 PAUL H. LIAPIS, USB #1956 PAUL H. LIAPIS, L.C. 
Attorney for Respondent 
175 West 200 South, Suite 2004 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
By. 
SALI Lrtjte OUOIVI 
Dsputy Cierft 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
NOEL C. GARDNER, 
vs. 
MARY H, GARDNER, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DEFINING HOLD 
HARMLESS CLAUSE, 
DENYING PETITIONER'S 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, 
RECEIPT OF EXHIBITS, 
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Civil No. 914900261 
Honorable Paul G. Maughan 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and the Respondent \s Reply to Petition to 
Modify Amended Decree of Divorce and Respondent's Counter Motion having come on regularly 
for trial before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan on February 10, 2010, Petitioner NOEL C. 
GARDNER appearing in person and by and through his attorneys of record, Michael K. Mohrman 
^ ^\ i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and Tracy C. Schofield of MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC, and the Respondent MARY H. 
GARDNER appearing in person and by and through her attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis of PAUL 
H. LIAPIS, LC, and the Court having initially entertained a dialogue, discussion, and questions to 
counsel with regards to the issues in this matter, and the Court having noted to the parties and 
counsels that it had reviewed each party's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, had 
reviewed each party' s Trial Memorandum, had conducted research on its own as to the matter of first 
impression, namely, the definition of the "hold harmless" clause in the context of the divorce 
proceeding and how that definition applies to the "hold harmless" clause in the Amended Decree of 
Divorce, and the Court having heard the arguments and impressions of counsel for Petitioner and 
Respondent, and having reviewed the records and files herein and being fully advised in the 
premises. 
NOW, THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. As a matter of first impression, the Court hereby rules that the meaning of "hold 
harmless" as it relates to paragraph 21 of the Amended Decree of Divorce in this matter requires the 
Respondent to hold the Petitioner harmless from the payment of the first mortgage to Washington 
Federal Savings and Loan. 
2. The Court concludes that to allow the Petitioner to present evidence on how he 
believes he has been damaged by the nonpayment of the June 2008 mortgage payment, the thirty-day 
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rolling mortgage arrearages thereafter, and his perception that such conduct is a breach of the "hold 
) harmless" clause would be extraordinarily speculative, and his request be and the same is hereby 
denied. 
3. Based upon the Court's review of the recent ruling in the matter of Ashby vs. Ashby, 
649 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (SC 2/10/10), the Court's concludes that the theory and ruling in that case 
on "extraordinarily speculative matters" is helpful in the analysis of its definition of "hold harmless" 
) in this matter. The Court concludes that the Petitioner' s theory and approach in this matter is just the 
opposite of the principle in the cases of Ashby vs. Ashby, (supra) and the case Martinez vs. Martinez, 
818 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1991). The Petitioner's action to come to this Court to present evidence 
on how he perceives and claims to have been damaged by what he calls Respondent's failure to pay 
the June 2008 mortgage payment on her home and breaches or actions which he feels have not held 
, him harmless, would be and is "extraordinarily speculative." The Court concludes that any recovery 
to the extent that the Petitioner is seeking would be "extraordinarily speculative" and therefore 
denies the same. 
4. The Court concludes and limits the "hold harmless" provision in this matter to 
damages actually suffered by the Petitioner for late payments, foreclosure costs, penalties, interest, 
and for monies paid by Petitioner which he was not obligated or planning to pay. 
5. The Court has determined that the mortgage to Washington Federal Savings and Loan 
3 
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is current and that the Respondent has made all payments, penalties, late fees, and interest on this 
mortgage. 
6. The Court has concluded that the Petitioner has not made any mortgage payments, 
late payments, penalties, fees, or interest for the Respondent and to Washington Federal Savings and 
Loans, and therefore he has not been damaged in any manner and that Respondent has held Petitioner 
harmless in accordance with the terms of paragraph 21 of the Amended Decree of Divorce. 
7. The Court concludes that damages for a failure to "hold harmless" in the context of 
this divorce proceedings are limited to actual damages caused by the non-obligated party's payment 
of the underlying obligation along with any late payments, foreclosures, penalties, or interest the non-
obligated party pays on the obligor's behalf. The Court concludes that since Petitioner had not made 
any such payments, he is not entitled to an award of damages against the Respondent resulting from 
the missed June 2008 mortgage payment and the thirty (30) day rolling mortgage arrearage that 
accrued thereafter through November 2008 and his claim for an award of damages be and the same 
is hereby denied. 
8. The Court concludes that if the Respondent had failed to make the mortgage 
payments and Petitioner felt he had not been held harmless from the mortgage that there was a 
remedy for the Petitioner to make the payments and to pursue a remedy of contempt or a remedy of 
reimbursement for the then actually incurred damages that Petitioner would have incurred by his 
payment of the mortgage or late fees against the Respondent. 
4 
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9. The Court concludes that it would be extraordinarily speculative to award the 
Petitioner damages for the alleged reduction in his credit score rating, the alleged reduction in the 
credit limit on his credit cards, the alleged suspension of his home equity line of credit, the alleged 
loss of his ability to refinance his home, for the attorney fees incurred in this matter, that he is not 
entitled to such an award, and his requests be and the same are hereby denied. 
10. Based upon the Court's rulings regarding the definition of"hold harmless," the Court 
concludes that the Respondent's failure to make the June 2008 payment and the thirty (30) day 
rolling arrearage does not constitute a material or substantial change of circumstances that would 
justify the Court in revisiting the provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce which awarded 
Respondent title and ownership of the home, the responsibility of making the first mortgage to 
Washington Federal, and to hold the Petitioner harmless from the mortgage to Washington Federal. 
11. The Court concludes that the Respondent has not failed to hold Petitioner harmless 
from the Washington Federal Savings and Loan first mortgage obligation, that the Petitioner is not 
entitled to a finding of contempt against the Respondent, and the same is hereby denied. 
12. The Court receives the Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 8 and 12 through 60 and 
Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 20 in this matter. 
13. Based upon the Court's findings and conclusions of law defining the "hold harmless" 
clause, the Respondent's missed and/or late payment and the thirty (30) day rolling arrearage do not 
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constitute a material and substantial change of circumstances that would justify the Court in 
revisiting the provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce awarding Respondent title and 
ownership of the home, responsibility for the assumption of the payment of the first mortgage to 
Washington Federal, and to hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
14. The Court concludes that in the future if the Respondent fails to make ongoing 
payments to Washington Federal Savings and Loan and if Petitioner determines that mortgage 
payments to Washington Federal have not been made that there is nothing that prohibits Petitioner 
from making those payments to protect himself and to redress repayments of those amounts by 
Respondent in the hearing before the Court. 
15. Both parties be and they are ordered to assume and pay their own attorney fees and 
costs with regards to the issues presented the Court in the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and 
the Order to Show Cause brought by Petitioner and the defenses and affirmative requests submitted 
by Respondent in this matter. 
DATED this j g day of May 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM 
this day of May 2010: 
By:_ 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 18th day of February 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Schofield, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street, Suite^OO 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
SECOND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 1 caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 11th day of March 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Schofield, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
i ***% * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THIRD CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 29T H day of March 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Schofield, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIEiJD, PC 
175 South Main Street, Suite^ 900 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 J 
FOURTH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 18th day of May 2010 to the following: 
Michael K. Molirman, Esq. 
Tracy C. Scho field, Esq. 
MOHRMAN & SCHOFIELD, PC 
175 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City UT 841 
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